Dual-earner couples in Europe: Evidence from the EU Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC 2005)

Lucia Coppola*, Cristina Freguja**
ISTAT – Via Adolfo Rava' 150, 00142 Rome, Italy
*lcoppola@istat.it, **freguja@istat.it

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1. Introduction

During last decades, European countries have been witness of increasing women's schooling and participation to labour market. The traditional partners' specialisation either in domestic or labour market activities, characterised by the husband-breadwinner and the wife devote to domestic work (Becker, 1991), has become less common, leaving room to dual-earner couples. The convergence of gender roles is usually considered as the result of a process of modernisation that is taking place through different pace in the EU countries: in the framework of the second demographic transition, northern countries are considered forerunner in adopting new behaviours, while southern countries are considered as the slowest (Van de Kaa, 1987).

Nowadays the proportion of dual-earner couples is generally higher than that of man-breadwinner ones. This might be the consequence of the convergence of gender roles, but also of the development of a new couple's strategy to face increasing men economic instability (Oppenheimer, 1994). However, the diffusion of dual-earner model is strongly heterogeneous among EU countries. On the one hand, northern European countries are characterized by a very small proportion of man-breadwinner households, while such a proportion is much higher in southern European countries (Pasqua, 2002).

Women's contribution to the couple income appears to be mostly secondary (Moen and Sweet, 2003). However, couples characterised by similar levels of partners' income are quite common, while the proportion of women out-earning their partners is generally small (Winkler et al., 2005).

In this paper we investigate the distribution of dual-earner couples in EU countries, particularly considering the association between individual and household characteristics and the likelihood for a couple to be dual-earner or man-breadwinner. After highlighting differences between these two types of couples, we focus on dual-earners: we distinguish among those where women contribute in a (i) smaller, (ii) similar or (iii) bigger proportion to the couple income in comparison with their partners, and wonder to what extent the individual and household characteristics considered are more likely to be associated to any of these models.

Several household and individual characteristics are associated with the women's level of contribution to the couple's income: e.g. partners age, educational level, labour force participation and presence of children (Raley et al., 2006). Furthermore, country specific socio-cultural characteristics may contribute to the diffusion of more or less gender equal couples, depending on institutionalised breadwinning expectations (Yodanis and Lauer, 2007). We expect that dual-earner models, and high levels of women's contributions to household income, are more likely adopted by "modern" couples: i.e. we expect to find these models

associated with younger cohorts, cohabiting couples, highly educated women and more educated than their partners (Raley *et al*., 2006). The presence of children might induce women to contribute less to the couple earnings, for increasing domestic work (Raley *et al*., 2006). But in contrast, we argue, that requiring children an important economic effort, women may need to provide a higher contribution to the family income.

We use data from the EU-Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2005edition, from providing comparable information on socio-demographic and economic characteristics at household and household members level (Eurostat, 2008a). In 2005 data are available for European countries representing the northern, southern, eastern and central areas. We are interesting in investigating if behavioural models may be heterogeneous among areas, but homogenous in each area. We expect that the different European areas would differ not only in terms of diffusion of partners contribution models, but also according to the household and individual characteristics associated with the preference for any of the models.

The paper is structured as follows: we provide an overview of the literature on dual-earner couples, and their characteristics in section 2; we describe data and method of analysis in section 3; results are summarised in section 4; and we discuss the conclusions in section 5.

2. Theoretical background

Women's increasing investments in educational and employment careers is a well know phenomenon, which is characterising EU countries, although at different levels. Having a quick look at employment rates in 2005, we note relevant differences among EU countries (Eurostat, 2008b). The highest levels of female employment rates are observed in northern countries, where varies from the 65% of Finland to the 80% of Iceland. On the other side, southern countries are witness of lower levels of women participation to labour force: from about 45% of women in Italy and Greece, to slightly more than 60% in Portugal. Easter countries show a more heterogeneous situation, which varies from the 45% of levels of Poland, to about 62% in Estonia. Under socialism, women's labour market participation was high, and gender pay gap low, if compared to other western countries. Since 1989, woman's participation to labour force drastically decreased (Newell and Reilly, 2001), and now these countries show a lower female labour force participation than northern countries. When considering the other European countries, we observe that the female employment rate varies between the 50 and 60%, with the exception of the United Kingdome and Netherlands where more than 65% of women work. In all European countries, women achieve higher educational levels than men. Particularly, the proportion of the population aged 20 to 24 having completed at least upper secondary education is always higher for woman than for men, while the percentage of the population aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education and not in further education or training is higher for men than for women (Eurostat, 2008b).

These trends are taking place at the same time with the diffusion of attitudes and values towards greater gender equality (Lesthaeghe, 1995), that reflects into a higher participation of men in household related activities (Jansen and Kalmijn, 2002), and in general in a more egalitarian division of labour and domestic work between partners (Jansen and Liefbroer, 2006).

The dynamics leading couples to decide how to share paid and unpaid work are complex. Partners, household and context characteristics contribute to define the opportunity costs of any possible scheme of labour division. Couples may choose among strategies that imply different levels of gender equality, partner's specialisation and dependence on each other.

A first choice would be between (i) the traditional man breadwinner model, where the husband provides the family with the economic resources and the wife carries out the domestic work and takes care of children; or (ii) the dual-earner regime, where both partners contribute to the household income.

According to the human-capital theory, investments in education increase work's productivity (Becker, 1964). Women's raised educational levels have in turn increased their capability to produce income by working, and possibly have decreased the couple's benefit for woman's specialisation in domestic activities. The New Economists (Becker, 1991), consider partners specialisation as a means to maximise the utility of their union. Both partners benefit if each partner specialises in the activities in which is more skilled. Paid and unpaid work, represent two relevant dimensions, partners negotiate about to find an optimal distribution of tasks. Broadly, if men gain more than women in spending their time on the labour market, the specialisation would take place according to the traditional gender specific pattern, with women committed to domestic activities and men to paid work. As soon as women's capability to produce income has increased, this type of complete specialisation has become less convenient, because renouncing to female productivity results in higher costs, for women but also for couples. Thus a dual-earner strategy may be more appealing for couples, whenever women invest in education.

Some authors put in evidence that women's contribution to the family economy may be not only the consequence of increasing personal opportunity in the labour market, but also of increasing family needs for economic resources, when worsening labour markets conditions hamper men's economic stability and productivity (Oppenheimer, 1994). Unfavourable economic situations, at country but also at household level, may force couples to opt for a dual-earner strategy, independently on women's education.

Another aspect that likely affects the preferences for either specialisation or distribution of tasks is represented by children. On the one hand, their presence would possibly increase burdens on the partner who mostly takes care of the domestic activities. Typically women, when have children, are the first who sacrifice own career for taking care of them (Vlasblom and Schippers, 2004). On the other hand, children represent a costly venture, and by increasing the family economic needs, would possibly increase the mother's need to produce income. Where the conflict between work and family is reduced by the presence of suitable social policies, possibly women would more easily keep on investing in employment, and contribute to the family economy (Wall, 2008).

Although dual-earner strategy is becoming increasingly common, the diffusion of this model in strongly heterogeneous among European countries. It is more widespread in the north of Europe, witness of a higher participation of women to the labour market, a higher participation of man to domestic work, and in general more narrowed gender roles (Di Giulio and Pinnelli, 2003). In contrast, in south European, where gender roles are slowly converging (Di Giulio and Pinnelli, 2003), dual-earner couples are spread, but the man

breadwinner model is still common. Eastern countries are historically witness of high levels of women's participation to labour force, but also of high levels of traditionalism in terms of distribution of domestic activities. Accordingly to the transition from the communist regimes, the situation has being worsening, suggesting that possibly these countries were characterized by similar gender roles only apparently (Di Giulio and Pinnelli, 2003).

A second choice, for dual-earner couples, would be about different levels of partners' distribution of paid and unpaid work. Particularly, they have to decide whether the woman should contribute (i) less, (ii) the same or (iii) more than the partner.

Among dual-earner couples, women's contribution to the economy of the family is often secondary, and the pattern of career hierarchy usually is in favour of men (Raley et al., 2006; Winkler and Rose, 2001). In those couples where women contribute less than their partners to the family income, there is a certain level of gender inequality that reflects into a higher involvement of women in housework, and a lower relevance in decision making, and managing of the family money (Tichenor, 1999; Brines, 1994). This model of dual-earner couples may be considered as a "neo-traditional" specialisation (Raley et al., 2006), in which both partners contribute to paid and unpaid work, but traditional gender roles still works, because men mostly invest in employment, and women mostly carry out domestic activities, take care of children, and invest in employment as a secondary activity. This strategy may be preferred in countries characterised by traditional values, where the man breadwinner model is more easily substituted by a similar scheme, which keeps traditional gender roles safe.

Dual-earner couples characterised by equal partners' contribution to the economy of the family have been found to be associated with higher gender equality (Yodanis and Lauer, 2007). The gap between partners involvement in housework decreases (Bittman et al., 2003), economic resources are more likely pooled and money managing and decision making is more often shared (Raley et al., 2006). Nock (2001) defines these couples as *Marriage of Equally Dependent Spouses* (MEDS). According to the author, this strategy represents a return to the traditional form of marriage, when "*husbands and wives mutually depended on each other to maintain the family enterprise*" (p. 757).

Eventually, other dual-earner couples are characterised by higher contribution of women to the family income. Atkinsons and Boles (1984) define them as *Wives of Senior Partners* (WASP). These type represents still a reduced proportion of the dual-earner couples, but is expected to increase.

Some evidence suggests that women main providers are highly educated, and receive high earnings in absolute (Raley et al., 2006; Winkler at al., 2005). Thus this strategy seems to be preferred when women's productivity in the labour market is high. But some evidence shows also that instead of being a rational strategy of distribution of paid and unpaid work between partners is the consequence of unfavourable and unstable men's economic condition (Winslow-Bowe, 2006; Raley et al., 2006). Moreover, some studies have shown that this strategy is often adopted as a temporarily solution. Indeed, a minority of women out-earns their partners, but even fewer do so during more than one year (Winkler at al., 2005; Winslow-Bowe, 2006).

This strategy of partners' contribution seems to be mostly imposed by lower men's earnings than from women's success in the labour market (Bernhardt et al., 1995; Winkler, 1998).

Particular interesting are some findings that reveal the existence of a curvilinear relationship between income contribution and gender equality. Thus, if gender equality is lower when the woman earns less than the partner, but increases when she earns the same, this trend does not hold when she earns more than he does. In fact, when the woman is the main provider, she does not take advantage from this condition, for instance to prevail in managing money, or to reduce the burden of her housework. Gender inequality is found, but it is not in favour of women, as we would expect, but once again in favour of man. In fact, couples seem to balance this "gender deviance" by increasing traditional roles in the housework (Bittman et al., 2003). This trend has been interpreted as the consequence of normative behaviour imposed by the social context. In practice, where social rules attribute to men the breadwinner role, even if women are the main provider, men have more power in decision making, and money managing (Tichenor, 1999; Yodanis and Lauer, 2007).

In this paper, we investigate on the diffusion of dual-earner couples, and different models of partners' contribution. Particularly, we compare northern, central, southern and eastern countries, in order to highlight differences in the diffusion of innovative dual-earner behaviours, and the household and partners' characteristics that mostly contribute to define the opportunity costs of the alternative behavioural models.

We expect that the traditional man breadwinner model would be still common in southern countries (Pasqua, 2002), where a high level of traditionalisms in the distribution of paid and unpaid work between partners seems to be preferred. Whenever a dual-earner strategy is preferred, we expect that women would be a secondary contributor. In practice, we expect that more easily the traditional specialisation would be replaced by a neo-traditional semi-specialisation. This would be possibly due to cultural aspects and the social expectation for women to be responsible for the domestic tasks, and for men to afford the economic needs of the family. But also the lack of adequate social policies aiming at solving the work/family problem certainly plays a role, hampering women's participation to the labour force and limiting their investments in employment career.

On the other hand, we expect to find dual-earner models commonly used by northern countries, forerunner in the convergence of gender roles (Lestaeghe, 1995), and in the social attention to balance work and family (Wall, 2008). Since similar levels of partners' contribution is associated with more gender equality in the couple (Raley et al., 2006), we would expect that couples in northern countries would more often use this kind of dual-earner model.

We argued that when the woman is the main provider, this is not necessarily the result of a complete gender role convergence, or of gender inequality in favour of women, but more usually is the consequence of unfavourable economic conditions, that stress families and impose women to afford most of the household costs. Women out-earn their partners when these receive low-wages (Winkler, 1998). We would expect this kind of behaviour more usually adopted in eastern countries, which are currently trying to achieve the

economic wellbeing characterising the other European countries, but are still characterized by low income and high unemployment rates (Rydeman and Tornell, 2004).

As far as the household and individual characteristics likely to define the opportunity costs of each possible strategy of partners' contribution, we would expect to find some difference from country to country, because individual behaviour, also in terms of income contribution or household decision making, is shaped not only according to individual characteristics, but also depending on behavioural rules defined by the social context (Treas, 1993), as well economic socio-economic conditions that may ease women's participation to labour force and balance between work and family.

Broadly, we expect that: woman's investments in education would be a good predictor of her level of contribution (Becker, 1984); the presence of children may induce higher economic costs but also higher burdens on the mother (Vlasblom and Schippers, 2004), and consequently may have opposite effects; the economic wellbeing of the household, if low would induce higher woman's involvement in the economic support of the family (Bernhardt et al., 1995; Winkler, 1998), and if high would make it less necessary.

3. Data and methods

Recently a new source of information for studying income, poverty, social exclusion and living conditions at EU level has become available to researchers. This is EU-SILC (EU-Statistics on Income and Living Conditions), thought to replace the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) which expired in 2001. EU-SILC was launched in 2004 in 15 countries (including 13 EU member states and Norway and Iceland). It covered the 25 EU countries as well as Norway and Iceland in 2005. In each country, the survey is carried out from the National Statistical Office (NSO). The reference population is represented by households, and household members, residing in the national territory at the moment of data collection (Eurostat, 2008a).

NSO can choose between two sampling procedures: (i) a sample of households is drawn and all current members are eligible to be surveyed; (ii) a sample of persons, called "selected respondents", is drawn and their households are surveyed. If the second option is preferred, income and demographic information are collected for all household members, while all the other information is collected only on the selected respondent[1]. As a consequence, for all those countries that use the selected respondent sampling, some information possibly of interest for researchers are not available for all household members, and as we will discuss later, not all analyses are possible.

As ECHP, EU-SILC provides cross-sectional and longitudinal information at household and individual level, for all household members aged 16 and over. Broadly, information belonging to the household, as expenses, or dwelling conditions are collected at household level, while information belonging to the individual as the educational and employment career, or the health conditions are collected at individual level. Yearly, Eurostat releases a cross-sectional and a longitudinal User Data Base (UDB) (Eurostat, 2008c). In principle, longitudinal and cross-sectional information may be collected on different samples, but in

[1] Countries that use the selected respondent are Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.

practice, countries mostly adopt a rotational panel design, and consequently the cross-sectional and longitudinal samples partly overlap. In any case, the longitudinal and cross-sectional datasets are considered as independent and cannot be linked. Although the two releases have most of the variables in common, some pertain to one release only.

In this paper we use the second edition of the cross-sectional release, which was carried out in 2005.

We are interested in the partners' contribution to the couple's income. Among the possible income features provided by the survey, we prefer to focus on earnings, for representing the component that each partner decides to produce actively. We select a sub-sample of couples, either married or living in a consensual union, composed by partners aged 25-54 years. We choose this selected age group, because in this stage of life partners are less likely to be inactive for reasons like education or retirement. According to this selection criteria, we have different size of sub-samples of couples, depending on the country (Table 1).

We compare partners' levels of earnings to define different models of couple. Firstly, we define two behavioural models: (i) a *man breadwinner* couple, where the man has the responsibility to economically support the family, while the woman does not earn anything, and (ii) a *dual-earner* couple, where both partners contribute to the economy of the family, by producing earnings. In this paper we disregard those couples where the man does not earn anything, for representing an extremely small proportion of the surveyed couples in most of the countries under study (Table 1).

In order to investigate which household and partner characteristics are more likely associated with the preference towards any of these two strategies, we apply a logistic regression model to each country. By comparing the estimates achieved for the countries under study, we would like to put in evidence possible differences in the partners and household characteristics that may turn into a more convenient strategy the *man breadwinner*, instead of the *dual-earner*.

After having detected who are the partners who prefer to contribute together to the household economic needs, we argue that partners' contribution may differ significantly, and we would like to investigate which are the household and partners characteristics likely to be associated with a gender equal or different contribution. Thus, among dual-earners we distinguish three models:

(i) *man main provider*, characterised by a higher contribution by the male partner, i.e. the woman earns less than the 40% of the sum of partners' earnings;

(ii) *equal providers*, where both partners contribute similarly, that is the woman earns between the 40% and the 60% of the sum of partners' earnings (Nock, 2001);

(iii) *woman main provider*, where the female partner contributes more, and earns more than the 60% of the sum of partners' earnings (Atkinson and Boles, 1984).

Having defined three alternative strategies, we use multinomial logistic regression to investigate the association between the selected covariates and the preference towards any of these models. In particular, we contrast (i) *man main provider* couples, against *equal providers*, and (ii) *woman main provider* couples, against *equal providers*.

EU-SILC provides information about several domains of the household and household members that may contribute to define the opportunity costs of the behavioural models so far defined. As far as partners characteristics are concerned, we consider woman's and partners' relative educational level attained. Woman's education is defined as "low" for primary or lower secondary education, "medium" for secondary or upper secondary education, and "high" for tertiary education. We expect that the higher the educational level, the more likely would be the couple to use a dual-earner model, and among the alternatives defined, possibly the *equal providers*, or the *woman main provider* strategy. In particular, we consider that highly educated women are not likely to renounce to a role in the labour market to devote exclusively to the household, and would prefer to contribute to the household economic needs as well as their partners. In fact, women who have invested much in education are also likely to invest in the employment career (Becker, 1991). Their higher chances of attaining good earnings in the labour market would possibly collocate these women in *equal providers* or *woman main provider* couples. Moreover, we compare the partners' educational levels, we distinguish among women who have achieved a lower, the same, or a higher educational level than the partner. We expect dual-earner models, and particularly the *equal providers*, or the *woman main provider*, would be more likely preferred by couples where the woman is the same or more educated than the partner, because the couples may favour the career of the partner with more education (Pixley and Moen, 2003).

We also consider the partners' age, because we expect that younger couples are more likely to adopt dual-earner models, and particularly an *equal providers* one, because convergence between gender roles is more usual among young individuals. Since partners' age is usually correlated, we consider only the woman's age, and define three age classes (25-34, 35-44, and 45-54 years old).

When we compare the three models of dual-earner couples, we consider also if the main source of earning of each partner is from employment or self-employment, wondering to what extent employment characteristics may favour any of the strategies in the countries under study. Moreover, job characteristics are available for both partners in the countries that adopt a sample of households, while this kind of information are available for the selected respondent only in the countries that prefer to use this second sampling option. As a consequence, for sake of comparison, we do not consider if these partners' job characteristics as part-time or full time, permanent/temporary contracts, may shape couples chances to choose one strategy in particular.

Concerning the household characteristics likely to define opportunity costs of the different strategies of partners' contribution to the economy of the family, we consider if partners are married or not. Those who live in consensual unions have been found to be more similar in terms of earnings and working hours, than married partners (Jepsen and Jepsen, 2002). Consensual unions may favour a dual-earner approach, not only because this kind of union is usually preferred by non-traditionalist partners, that according to their values may promote the adoption of gender equal roles (Clarkberg *et al*., 1995), but also because in some countries this unions are considered as a trial period, preceding a registered partnership (Rosina and Fraboni, 2004).

This is the case in the southern European countries, where cohabiting partners may consider as less convenient a specialisation either in domestic or work activities, and a consequent dependence on each other.

Children are likely to have a relevant impact on the division of partners' tasks. In particular, we expect that the presence of children may imply an increase of partners' family related activities that in turn would reflect in a decrease of working hours. On the other hand, children related costs may increase the family economic needs, and consequently their investments in work activities. Another dimension to be considered is the age of the children. A child in pre-scholar age (say less than 6 years old) is particularly demanding, and may require the mother's more than the father's attention, especially in those countries where domestic activities are mainly afforded by women. Overall, we expect that the presence of children, especially in pre-scholar age, would be associated with the use of gender specialised economic roles, and in particular in the preference for a man sole or main provider strategy. This finding is expected as more evident in countries where gender roles are less similar.

The household economic condition is taken into account, because the different strategies of partners' economic contribution may be more or less convenient depending on the economic wellbeing of the household. Particularly, we expect that women would be more likely to contribute to the family economy, and to be the main provider when the household is facing unfavourable economic conditions. In this case, in fact, women's contribution represents an advantage for the whole family. We consider the household equivalised disposable income as a measure of the household economic wellbeing. We consider the deciles of the national household income distribution, and define five groups, from the poorer to the richer (1-2, 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 and 9-10 decile). We expect to find the more traditional behavioural models, that is, the man breadwinner or main provider, among the richer classes. Women living in the richer families face lower needs for contributing the economy of the family, and can more easily assume a traditional or neo-traditional role of secondary contributor. However, it may be argued that a family may be wealthy because there is a double contribution. In contrast, we expect that poorer families, because they face unfavourable economic conditions, would need to rely on the women's economic support, and we expect that the dual-earner, and especially the *woman main provider* model would be preferred.

In this paper we put in relation information on income, and information on household and partners characteristics, in order to point out if and to what extent the strategies of partners contribution to the couple's economy is associated with specific family and family members' situations, and the associations found differ from country to country. Before discussing our findings we have to highlight a drawback of the chosen data source. The variables yearly collected refer to different time periods that do not overlap completely. Particularly, the income reference period is usually the previous calendar year (i.e. for the survey carried out in 2005, the income variables at household and individual level refer to the 2004). Other variables refer to the last 12 months: this is the case of some information on social exclusion at household level, or of health variables at individual level. Depending on when the survey is carried out in different countries, the last 12 months might more or less overlap with the income reference period. Eventually, some other variables are collected as they are at the moment of interview, as for the household composition or the

dwelling conditions, or the labour or education career of the household members. In the case of the variables under study in this paper, those on partners' earnings, and source of earnings, as well as those on the household equivalised income refer to the previous calendar year, while all the other characteristics refer to the moment of the interview. As a consequence, information collected at the interview date is not necessarily the same as when the strategy of partners' contribution was used. An exception in represented by the presence of children, and their age, which can be computed as it was the previous year. As a consequence, we have to assume that the dependent variable at the moment of the interview is the same, or at least similar to that adopted at the moment of the interview.

4. Results

Models of partners' contribution

We firstly compare the distribution of couples by the levels of man and woman contribution to the couple's earnings. In this stage we distinguish between the following models:

(i) *man breadwinner* (she does not earn anything),
(ii) *man main provider* (she contributes less than 40% of the couple's earnings),
(iii) *equal providers* (she contributes between the 40% and the 60% of the couple's earnings),
(iv) *woman main provider* (she contributes more than 60% of the couple's earnings), and
(v) *woman breadwinner* (he does not earn anything).

The persistence of the traditional strategy of *man breadwinner* varies considerably among countries (Table 1). As expected, in northern countries as Denmark, Finland, Norway, Iceland and Sweden, less than 10% of the selected sub-sample of couples adopts this scheme of partner's contribution to earnings. This is also due to public policies in favour of dual-earner families, that ease access to flexible forms of employment and to childcare services (Lewis *et al*., 1992; Wall, 2008). In contrast, in southern countries, as Spain, Italy, and Greece more than 30% of couples prefer this model. Portugal shows a slightly lower percentage (25%). Also Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Poland are witness of a common diffusion of the traditional *man breadwinner* division of roles.

On the opposite, eastern countries show a high diffusion of the *woman breadwinner* model: in Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia, in more than 10% of couples she is the only one who produces income. Estonia, Hungary, Latvia show lower percentages, but in any case higher than in the other EU countries. This finding is possibly due to high unemployment rates characterising these countries (Rydeman and Tornell, 2004).

According to preliminary descriptive statistics, the *dual-earner* model is confirmed to be preferred by EU couples (Pasqua, 2002), although women's contribution is usually secondary to that of their partners (Moen and Sweet, 2003). Northern countries stick out for showing the wider diffusion of the *man main provider* model: Norway and Iceland show the highest percentage (more than 50% of couples adopt this model), followed by Finland and Sweden. In turn, the *equal providers* model is slightly less frequently preferred. The only exception is represented by Denmark, where the *equal providers* model is more spread

than the *man main provider* one. This is possibly due the those public policies, that in the one hand ease mothers' conciliation of family and work, as for instance access to part-time jobs, but on the second hand induce them to reduce working hours, and their contribution to the economy of the family becomes secondary (Lewis *et al*., 1992). Other countries like Austria, Netherlands, United Kingdome show a wide diffusion of the *man main provider* model (more than 40% of couples). As far as the other countries are concerned, distributions show that usually *man main provider* model is slightly more frequently preferred than the *equal providers*, while the *woman main provider* model is quite unusual. However, this last strategy is more spread in eastern countries, as for the *woman breadwinner*.

In the following we investigate which are the household and partners' characteristics more likely associated with the models defined. Firstly, we contrast *man breadwinner* couples against *dual-earners*. Secondly, we consider only dual-earner couples, and contrast *man main provider* and *woman main provider* vs. *equal providers*. We decided to disregard the *woman breadwinner model*, for being adopted by a fewer couples in most of the countries under study.

Man breadwinner vs. dual-earner couples

When we look at the partners' and household characteristics associated with a higher likelihood of being in a *man breadwinner* couple, we notice that countries are not much heterogeneous (Table 2). The parameter estimates, when significant, usually show the same sign. We notice that differences among countries can be noticed in terms of statistical significance of the characteristics considered.

In northern countries we find that just a few household and partners characteristics are associated with the preference for the *man breadwinner* model. For instance, there is not evidence for a change in this preference by woman's age. Only in Denmark and Finland, women 35-44 years old are less likely to be in a *man breadwinner* couple if compared with the older generation (45-54 years old). But this trend does not hold for the younger generation (25-34 years old) that does not behave significantly differently from the reference category.

As far as education is concerned, both woman's level attained, and the difference between partners are usually significantly associated with the likelihood of being in a traditional couple. Particularly, highly and lowly educated women are respectively less and more likely to be in a *man breadwinner* couple (with the exception of Iceland, where the estimates are not significant). As we were expecting, women's investments in education reduce the convenience of a complete specialisation in domestic activities (Becker, 1991; Oppenheimer, 1994), while low educated women face less drawbacks when renouncing to paid work. Similarly, if she is more or less educated than the partner, she is respectively more or less likely to contribute to the economy of the family. Also the theory of the partners' comparative advantage seems to be confirmed (Becker, 1991). If she is more skilled than him, her devotion to domestic work is less advantageous for both. But relative education is significant only in Iceland and Finland, suggesting that in northern countries, woman's education is relevant *per se*, and the negotiation between partners is less likely affected by the comparison between educational attainments of the partners.

Whether the couple is in a consensual union or a registered partnership is not related to the couple strategy of contribution in any of the northern countries, showing that possibly the cultural acceptance of consensual unions allows couples to behave similarly, independently on the living arrangement they choose.

The presence of children increases couples preferences for a traditional strategy of partners' contribution to the family economy. Broadly, the presence of children is associated with a lower likelihood to be in a man breadwinner couple, suggesting that the costly venture of having children would favour women's involvement in paid work. But when the child is in pre-scholar age, the man is more likely the only breadwinner. Possibly, in northern countries women can more easily choose to quit the labour force when children are young in order spend more time on their care, but as soon as children grow up, they re-enter the labour market (Wall, 2008). Once again, the significance of these characteristics differs from country to country. The age of the child is relevant in all countries but Norway, and the presence of children is not important in Iceland, and in the other countries varies depending on the number of children.

Eventually, we consider the household economic conditions. Considering the richest households and the reference category, we notice that the man is more likely to be the only breadwinner in the two poorest groups, but less likely in the second richer group. Families in an intermediate position do not significantly differ from the wealthiest. Thus, families facing the most unfavourable economic situation are mainly *man breadwinner*. This would contrast the argument that women are more likely to contribute when the partner is not able to afford the economic needs of the household (Oppenheimer, 1994; Winkler, 1998). On the other side, we may argue that women who do not work, especially in northern countries, may be those less attractive on the labour market, and possibly prefer not to join because working would not be enough rewarding, o more simply they do not succeed in finding an occupation.

When we look at southern countries, we firstly notice that usually all the partners and household characteristics taken into account significantly contribute to shape the opportunity costs of the alternative strategies of partners' contribution. There exists a clear pattern by woman's age. The younger she is, the less likely the couple is to adopt a traditional *man breadwinner* strategy. This pattern suggests that the diffusion of dual-earner couples is increasing, and goes ahead with the convergence between gender roles (Pasqua, 2002; Raley et al., 2006; Vlasblom et al., 2004). In all countries (but Greece) both woman's educational level and partners' relative education play an important role in the preference towards a *man breadwinner* or *dual-earner* model. Also in the south of Europe, as we noticed for northern countries, highly educated women, especially if more educated than their partner, are more likely to prefer a double contribution to the traditional partners' specialisation.

Couples living in a consensual union are much less likely to adopt a *man breadwinner* strategy in southern countries. Thus, where consensual unions are considered as an "innovative" behaviour, because social norms and policies still favour marriages, cohabiting individuals possibly are those who have interiorised more modern values, and are also more likely to prefer a non traditional strategy of contribution (Lestaeghe and Moors, 2002). Moreover, in southern Europe, consensual unions are often considered as a "trial" period, expected to be converted in a marriage if the union works. Being considered as a provisional

living arrangement, as long as they live in a consensual union, partners do not consider as convenient a specialisation either in paid or unpaid work, because if the union breaks, especially for the woman would be difficult recover the experience lost in labour market.

The effects due to the presence and the age of children are less homogeneous among southern countries. In Greece, the more children the less likely is the man to be the only breadwinner, possibly because children induce higher economic needs. In Italy and Portugal only couples with 1-2 children behave differently from couples without children, while those with 3 or more children do not. In Spain, instead, having 3 or more children makes the difference. The presence of children in pre-scholar age in associated with a higher preference for the woman's specialisation into domestic work only in Spain and Greece. Possibly these differences depend on country specific childcare policies and services, or social networking strategies, that may favour women's involvement in paid work.

Concerning the household income, a U shaped trend emerges: the *man breadwinner* strategy is more spread among richer and poorer households, and is less used among mid-class families. Possibly, the richest family partners can more easily choose to specialise, because have they are able to fulfil their economic need even if the woman does not produce income. On the other hand, the poorest households possibly would not gain enough from women's investments in paid work, and a traditional specialisation is more convenient.

When looking at the eastern countries, we notice that as for the northern ones, there is not a clear path by age. The intermediate age class seems to be the less likely to use a *man breadwinner* strategy. Woman's education shows similar results to those observed for the other countries (with the exception of Slovakia, where this characteristic is not significant), while partners' relative education is significant only in Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, where if she is more educated, he is less likely the breadwinner.

Living in a consensual union or in a registered partnership does not make any difference.

The presence of children in pre-scholar age is always associated with a preference for partners specialisation, while the number of children has less clear relation with the partners contribution: 1-2 children seem to make couples favour a double contribution only in Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, while 3 or more children increases for a man to be the breadwinner in Hungary and Latvia, and decrease it in Slovakia.

The trend by household income is coherent with that discussed for the other countries.

Eventually, considering the remaining countries, in Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, France, and Ireland, we notice the same kind of association between the household and individual characteristics and the likelihood of being in a *man breadwinner* couple, as in southern countries. The traditional partners' specialisation is less common among couples characterised by younger cohorts of women, (with the only exception of Ireland where woman's age is not significant), highly educated women, and more educated than their partners, consensual union, the presence of children, and intermediate levels of household income. In contrast, the man breadwinner is more likely in couples where the woman is lowly educated and less than the partner, children are in pre-scholar age and the household is at the top or bottom of the distribution of income. The countries not yet discussed show a mixture of the patterns so far defined.

Man Main Provider and Woman Main Provider vs. Equal Providers

When we compare the household and partners characteristics associated with the likelihood of using a *man* or *woman main provider* strategy instead of the *equal providers*, we notice that discovering association homogenous in the European areas so far discussed, but heterogeneous among areas is even harder (Table 3).

Regarding *northern countries*, woman's age is mostly non significant, showing that there is not a clear path in the generational diffusion of the three dual-earner models we defined.

Woman's educational level is more likely to affect the chance of adopting a *woman main provider* model, while partners' relative education is relevant in defining the likelihood of being in a *man main provider* model. In fact, if compared with couples who adopt an *equal providers* strategy, highly educated women are more likely to contribute more than their partner, while women less educated than the partner are more likely to use a *man main provider* scheme. That is, women's investments in education result in a higher chance for the woman to become the main provider; inequality in partners' education attained reflects into neo-traditional specialisation if she is less educated, or in gender equal model of contribution if she is more educated. Only in Norway, both her educational level and partners' relative education are associated as expected to the likelihood of preferring a *man main provider* model, but not with that of preferring the *woman main provider* model.

Living in a consensual union is associated with a higher likelihood of being in a *woman main provider* model in Iceland and Finland, and with a lower likelihood of being in a *man main provider* model in Norway and Sweden (non significant in the other cases).

The presence of children, especially if in pre-scholar age, favours the neo-traditional scheme of income contribution. When the woman has to take care of children, even in these modern countries, she assumes a secondary role in the economic support of the family. Moreover, when children are 3 or more, she is also less likely to become the main provider.

When his main source of income is self-employment, she is more likely the main provider, and less likely the secondary provider. Thus, man relative instability in the labour market seems to induce the woman to be more responsible for the economy of the family (Oppenheimer, 1994). If her main source of income is self-employment the effect is less clear. She is more likely to be the secondary provider in Denmark and Iceland, and to be the main provider in Denmark, while she is less likely to be the main provider in Finland.

Eventually, the woman is more likely the main provider mostly in the poorer family, while her secondary role is not clearly associated with the household economic wellbeing. These findings seem to confirm that when the woman is the main provider, it is because the household is facing unfavourable economic conditions.

In *southern countries*, we find that differently from what observed for the diffusion of dual-earner couples, we do not find a trend of diffusion of the three models by age. Only in Italy and Portugal, the youngest generation (25-34 years old) of women is less likely to be the main provider. We would have expected to find an opposite relation, for young couples being holder of modern values, and for young men facing unfavourable economic opportunities in the labour market. Possibly, our finding may be due more to a

life-stage effect than a generational one. Maybe, these women have not yet spend enough time in the labour market to achieve a good economic position.

Women's education, and partners' relative education, instead, is important in defining the likelihood of adopting a *man* or *woman main provider* model. As expected, if she is lowly and less educated than the partner, the couple would prefer a neo-traditional specialisation, and she would be the secondary provider. On the other hand, if she is highly and more educated than the partner, then she is more likely the main provider. Living in a consensual union is significant only in Greece, where cohabiting couples more likely opt for an equal contribution. Children presence is almost non significant. Only in Italy and Spain, they induce women to be the secondary provider. When his main source of income is the self-employment she is more likely the main provider, but otherwise the association between partners' income source and model of contribution is not clear. Eventually, she is less likely to be the secondary provider in the intermediate household income classes, while she is the main provider in the poorest class in Italy and Portugal.

Regarding *eastern countries*, women age 25-34 years appear to be more likely the secondary provider. The effect of the educational level seems to be mostly related to the likelihood to be the secondary provider, while has not a clear relationship with that of being the main. In contrast, partners' relative education plays a role in defining opportunity costs of both asymmetric levels of contribution. When she is less educates, she is more likely the secondary provider, and less likely the main provider than an equal contributor. Similarly, if she is more educated, she is more likely an equal provider, or the main provider.

Living in a consensual union is usually not significant, with the exception of the Czech Republic, where couples in this union are more equal in the level of economic contribution, and Poland where this couples more likely adopt a *woman main provider* model.

In Czech Republic, and Hungary, the more the children, the more likely she is to be the secondary provider. In these countries and Lithuania, also children in pre-scholar age let women contribute less. Children do not make a *woman main provider* model more or less convenient than an equal one.

When men's main income source is from self-employment, couples are more likely to adopt a *man* or *woman main provider* model, than an *equal providers* one. The same holds if the woman's income is from self-employment, although less frequently significant. These findings suggest that employees prefer an equal level con partners' contribution, possibly because they have more similar levels of productivity in the market.

Eventually, differently from the others, eastern countries do not show a specific pattern of diffusion of the dual-earner models considered by household income. These countries represent the only social context where a *woman main provider* model is not positively associated with the poorer economic families. Generally speaking, the behavioural models investigated are hardly affected by the individual and household characteristics considered, and the more relevant aspects are partners' education, and the presence of children. Two dimension that possibly define women's productivity on the labour market, and opportunity costs of a specialisation in domestic activities.

For the remaining countries, we notice that findings similar to those so far discussed. Generally, partners relative education is always associated with the choice between a neo-traditional *man main provider* model and the more gender narrowed, *equal providers* one, but is usually not associated with the choice between *equal providers* and *woman main provider*. For this second choice, instead, the woman's educational level become relevant. Possibly differences between the partners affect the negotiation for the division of paid and unpaid work, and if she is more educated, the couple is more likely gender equal. Women's investments in education, instead, affect her productivity in the labour market, and when she is highly educated, she becomes more easily the main provider. As we argued, the preference for the *woman main provider* model, instead of the *equal providers*, does not necessarily reflect into higher gender equality in the couple. Consensual unions are generally more likely gender equal, and in fact they usually adopt an *equal providers* model in all the central European countries, but Austria, and Ireland. However, there is never a significant association with the choice between the *equal providers* and the *woman main provider* model. Children are often non significant, but when they are, their presence is usually associated with the *man main provider* model. Eventually, household income is relevant mainly when comparing the *woman main provider* with the *equal providers*, because she is the main provider in the poorest families in Austria, Cyprus, Netherlands, France, Ireland, and United Kingdome. Surprisingly, the poorer families are also more likely to be in a *man main provider* regime in France and Netherlands.

5. Conclusions

The diffusion of dual-earner couples is increasing in Europe, and is becoming the strategy of partners' contribution preferred by most of the couples (Pasqua, 2002). This trend is partly the result of the increasing women's investments in education and employment careers (Becker, 1991), but also of the spreading of values and attitudes towards greater gender equality (Lestaheghe, 1995). However, among European countries, relevant differences in the spreading of dual-earner couples, and among these of different levels of women's contribution hold. Women are usually the secondary provider, and the career hierarchy is in favour of men (Winkler, 1998; Winslow-Bowe, 2006).

In this paper we use data for the edition 2005 of the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), which provides demographic characteristics, as well as information about income, education, and employment at household and individual level, for several EU countries.

In a comparative framework, we investigate to what extent the traditional man breadwinner model persists in the countries under study. Moreover, among dual-earner couples, we wonder to what extent women are the secondary, equal or main provider. Particularly, we consider a set of household and individual characteristics likely to shape the opportunity costs of the alternative strategies of partners' contribution, in order to highlight how countries differ, not only in terms of diffusion of the strategies, but also in terms of couples' characteristics.

We find that the distribution of the models defined according to woman's level of contribution to the couples earnings is quite heterogeneous among the European countries. However, some homogenous areas

can be note. In northern countries just a small proportion of couples still adopts a man breadwinner model, while most of women contribute to the family income. But among dual-earner couples, women appear mostly the secondary provider. Although equal provider partners are quite common, a neo-specialisation of partners is still more often preferred in the northern countries under study, with the only exception of Denmark. This is partly due to the spread of modern values that ease the convergence of gender roles, but also to social policies that help women in balancing work and family, favouring the access to childcare services and flexible forms of employment, as part-time contracts.

Southern countries, instead, are witness of a common use of the traditional specialisation of partners. Although there are more dual-earner couples than man breadwinner, the proportion of couples who adopt the traditional specialisation is far the higher in Europe. On the one hand, in these countries, the traditionalism characterising the socio-cultural contexts favours the survival of traditional distribution of tasks between partners. On the second hand, the lack of adequate social policies aiming at allowing women to reconcile work and family hamper their participation to labour force.

Eastern countries show a proportion of man breadwinner couples in-between the levels observed for southern and northern countries, but the highest proportion of woman main provider couples. Possibly the unfavourable economic conditions, and the high unemployment rates, reduce woman to be the only or the main provider quite often. The relatively high proportion of man breadwinner is possibly due to high unemployment rates faced also by women, but also to a traditional gender division of domestic task that was characterising eastern countries also under the socialist regimes.

When looking at the household and individual characteristics associated with the partners' contribution models, we notice that there are relevant differences among countries, and the areas they belong to.

The dual-earner is an innovating behaviour which is spreading generation by generation in southern and central European countries, but does not follow a clear patterns in northern and eastern countries. Education plays a role every where: the more educated she is, especially if more educated than the partner, the less convenient becomes the traditional woman's devotion to domestic activities. Consensual unions are more likely to prefer a strategy of double contribution in southern and central Europe, while the living arrangement does not play a role in northern and eastern countries. The effect of children is quite heterogeneous: generally the more children in the family, the more likely the woman is to contribute to the economy of the family, while if there is a child in pre-scholar age, woman's devotion do the care of the family seems to be more convenient. However this effects are more or less significant, possibly depending on country specific policies in favour of the settlement of the work and family conflict. Eventually, the breadwinner model is more usually spread among the richer and poorer households in all Europe.

Looking more in depth the difference among the three models of dual-earner couples we defined, we notice that woman's educational level and partners' relative education are important in all the countries under study. Woman's education *per se* appears relevant when comparing the woman main provider model with the equal providers one, while difference between partners' educational levels appears mostly related with the choice between the neo-traditional model of the man main provider and the more gender equal

model of the equal providers. That is, women's investments in education result in a higher chance for the woman to become the main breadwinner; inequality in partners' education reflects into neo-traditional specialisation if she is less educated, or in gender equal model of contribution if she is more educated.

Living in a consensual union is usually not associated with the alternative models of partners' contribution, but in general, in northern countries cohabiting couples are less likely to adopt a man main provider model, while in eastern country they are more likely in a woman main provider strategy.

Children are relevant mainly in northern countries, where their presence, especially if they are in pre-scholar age, is associated mainly with a man main provider model. Holding these findings especially in northern countries, we argue that the neo-traditional strategy becomes particularly convenient when social policies allow partners to find a balance between work and family. Possibly women mostly benefit of the policies that allow them to reduce they involvement in the labour market, without being penalised in their future careers. In the other countries, instead, the association is not always significant. Generally, the more and the younger children are, they more likely the man is the main provider.

Eventually, in most of the countries, the woman main provider model is mostly associated with the poorer families, showing that this strategy is more likely adopted when the family faces economic troubles, and is more often a constraint than a free choice.

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Table 1. Distribution of couples by levels of woman's contribution to the couple's earnings and country

Woman contribution	Austria	Belgium	Cyprus	Czech Repub.	Denmark	Estonia	Finland	France	Greece	Hungary	Ireland	Iceland
0%	27.93	23.13	30.01	21.02	6.15	15.00	7.84	20.60	44.72	24.11	32.45	7.39
1-39%	40.61	*32.46*	37.51	31.22	*38.34*	35.61	43.93	35.31	23.21	27.79	34.25	54.32
40-59%	24.20	*36.39*	25.89	29.41	*45.36*	31.15	32.99	32.93	24.75	28.58	23.47	29.28
60-99%	4.16	4.16	4.66	2.98	6.87	11.42	11.81	7.98	4.20	12.01	5.28	7.10
100%	3.10	3.86	1.94	15.37	3.28	*6.82*	3.44	3.19	3.13	*7.50*	4.55	1.90
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
# couples	1901	1682	1653	1275	2619	1480	4453	3447	1883	2281	1781	1366

Woman contribution	Italy	Lithuania	Luxem.	Latvia	Nether.	Norway	Poland	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	Slovakia	UK
0%	32.96	17.83	35.14	18.21	17.09	7.34	35.12	*25.92*	38.57	7.98	14.90	20.09
1-39%	31.92	28.38	34.03	33.20	56.46	51.13	20.96	30.95	27.59	45.43	31.83	42.02
40-59%	27.99	29.84	23.01	29.70	19.75	30.98	19.40	28.49	24.06	34.00	34.74	25.61
60-99%	4.52	12.25	4.30	11.39	3.83	7.70	11.06	7.84	4.90	9.00	7.54	7.16
100%	2.61	11.70	3.53	*7.50*	2.88	2.86	13.47	6.81	4.88	3.59	10.98	5.12
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
# couples	7393	1649	1443	1027	4097	2521	6156	1748	5001	2256	2268	3225

Table 2. *Man Breadwinner* vs. *Dual-earner* couples: parameter estimates, standard error and level of significance by country

	Austria			**Belgium**			**Cyprus**			**Czech Republic**			**Denmark**			**Estonia**		
	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p
Intercept	-0.8920	0.1411	***	-0.9297	0.1521	***	-0.7200	0.3439	**	-0.3412	0.2086		-2.0477	0.1318	***	-1.0525	0.1250	***
Woman's Age																		
45-54 Years	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
35-44 Years	-0.3047	0.0836	***	-0.2116	0.1023	**	-0.0425	0.0905		-0.3514	0.1364	**	-0.2735	0.1328	**	-0.1083	0.1204	
25-34 Years	-0.1170	0.0982		-0.4448	0.1345	***	-0.3874	0.1109	***	-0.0186	0.1407		0.0548	0.1509		-0.1550	0.1553	
Woman's Education																		
Medium	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
Low	0.2117	0.1269	*	0.5597	0.1173	***	0.3143	0.1128	***	-0.3514	0.2677		0.6820	0.1694	***	0.5274	0.2207	**
High	-0.1570	0.1398		-0.4828	0.1263	***	-0.3258	0.1245	***	0.4924	0.2331	**	-0.2666	0.1641		-0.5213	0.1922	***
Partnes' relative education																		
Equally educ.	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
She more educ.	-0.3465	0.1661	**	-0.3257	0.1397	**	-0.1562	0.1217		-0.2419	0.2644		0.1224	0.1666		-0.0525	0.1855	
She less educ.	0.2287	0.1274	*	0.3999	0.1305	***	0.2910	0.1188	**	0.3928	0.2296	*	0.1556	0.1701		0.0198	0.1927	
Union Type																		
Marriage	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
Consensual Union	-0.1654	0.1203		-0.4519	0.1356	***	-0.3164	0.3408		-0.00636	0.1694		-0.1285	0.1110		0.0826	0.0960	
Number of Children																		
0	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
1-2 children	-0.1239	0.0842		-0.1770	0.0980	*	-0.1425	0.0889		-0.2117	0.1274	*	-0.2752	0.1265	**	0.0229	0.1197	
3+ children	0.2776	0.1089	**	-0.0237	0.1337		-0.1930	0.1074	*	0.0973	0.1805		-0.3669	0.1802	**	0.0459	0.1517	
Child's Age																		
Youngest >=6	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
Youngest <6	0.5789	0.0754	***	0.1242	0.1080		0.1510	0.0842	*	0.9610	0.1107	***	0.3888	0.1245	***	0.8115	0.1142	***
Household income																		
decile 9-10	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
decile 7-8	-0.7444	0.1296	***	-1.0264	0.1370	***	-0.9525	0.1256	***	-0.7689	0.1619	***	-0.7894	0.1649	***	-0.7117	0.1610	***
decile 5-6	-0.1274	0.1095		-0.3231	0.1258	**	-0.1351	0.1129		-0.3540	0.1637	**	0.0152	0.1584		-0.1350	0.1505	
decile 3-4	0.5906	0.1061	***	0.8147	0.1504	***	0.9589	0.1230	***	0.5167	0.1636	***	0.9751	0.1840	***	0.4581	0.1719	***
decile 1-2	1.3184	0.1245	***	2.1155	0.2218	***	1.6969	0.1957	***	1.6447	0.2119	***	1.4636	0.2380	***	1.2062	0.1722	***

(***) p<0.01; (**) p<0.05; (*) p<0.1

Table 2: *Man Breadwinner* vs. *Dual-earner* couples: parameter estimates, standard errors and level of significance by country (continue)

	Finland			**France**			**Greece**			**Hungary**			**Ireland**			**Iceland**		
	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p
Intercept	-2.0253	0.0905	***	-1.1227	0.0752	***	-0.7587	0.2612	***	-0.7180	0.1080	***	-0.4227	0.1535	***	-2.7459	0.1888	***
Woman's Age																		
45-54 Years	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
35-44 Years	-0.2034	0.0884	**	-0.2891	0.0703	***	-0.0487	0.0770		-0.3577	0.0900	***	-0.0837	0.0869		-0.1887	0.1622	
25-34 Years	0.00936	0.1047		-0.2244	0.0867	***	-0.2283	0.0925	**	-0.0381	0.0930		-0.1833	0.1153		0.1489	0.2005	
Woman's Education																		
Medium	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
Low	0.1708	0.1308		0.2126	0.0944	**	0.4400	0.0957	***	0.2937	0.1285	**	0.3973	0.1048	***	0.3156	0.1947	
High	-0.2103	0.1176	*	-0.1982	0.0982	**	-0.6708	0.1091	***	-0.1843	0.1388		-0.3908	0.1123	***	-0.3334	0.2407	
Partnes' relative education																		
Equally educ.	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
She more educ.	-0.2378	0.1110	**	-0.2608	0.0972	***	0.0252	0.1057		-0.2653	0.1394	*	-0.3954	0.1173	***	-0.8314	0.3021	***
She less educ.	0.3077	0.1164	***	0.2475	0.0945	***	0.1605	0.1010		0.2819	0.1312	**	0.3254	0.1151	***	0.6409	0.2222	***
Union Type																		
Marriage	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
Consensual Union	-0.0459	0.0797		-0.1900	0.0664	***	-0.8913	0.2545	***	-0.1353	0.0876		-0.3093	0.1391	**	-0.3345	0.1436	**
Number of Children																		
0	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
1-2 children	-0.0389	0.0835		-0.3355	0.0672	***	-0.1665	0.0801	**	-0.2994	0.0828	***	-0.1624	0.0875	*	-0.1484	0.1552	
3+ children	-0.3230	0.1106	***	0.4147	0.0880	***	-0.2927	0.1184	**	0.2608	0.1118	**	0.1967	0.1045	*	-0.0149	0.1814	
Child's Age																		
Youngest >=6	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
Youngest <6	0.5721	0.0842	***	0.4009	0.0661	***	0.2880	0.0737	***	0.9178	0.0760	***	0.2974	0.0798	***	0.2598	0.1446	*
Household income																		
decile 9-10	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
decile 7-8	-0.7202	0.1273	***	-1.0108	0.1087	***	-0.8216	0.1056	***	-0.7096	0.1219	***	-1.0075	0.1205	***	-0.6616	0.2436	***
decile 5-6	-0.1247	0.1164		-0.2460	0.0927	***	-0.0187	0.1021		-0.00509	0.1105		0.1628	0.1145		-0.0463	0.1991	
decile 3-4	0.8645	0.1114	***	0.5753	0.0887	***	0.5611	0.1068	***	0.2826	0.1130	**	0.8622	0.1575	***	0.1104	0.2171	
decile 1-2	1.5629	0.1302	***	1.6235	0.1060	***	1.4353	0.1381	***	1.2721	0.1167	***	1.4700	0.2371	***	1.2495	0.2196	***

(***) p<0.01; (**) p<0.05; (*) p<0.1

Table 2: *Man Breadwinner* vs. *Dual-earner* couples: parameter estimates, standard errors and level of significance by country (continue)

	Italy			**Lithuania**			**Luxembourg**			**Latvia**			**Netherlands**			**Norway**		
	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p
Intercept	-0.9350	0.0823	***	-0.7403	0.2181	***	-0.7629	0.1143	***	-0.9030	0.1722	***	-1.6422	0.0833	***	-2.0272	0.1237	***
Woman's Age																		
45-54 Years	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
35-44 Years	-0.1775	0.0421	***	-0.1947	0.1138	*	-0.1507	0.0890	*	-0.1573	0.1344		0.0774	0.0661		-0.1654	0.1196	
25-34 Years	-0.2184	0.0515	***	-0.1455	0.1430		-0.4962	0.1078	***	-0.1891	0.1634		-0.5107	0.0891	***	-0.1390	0.1450	
Woman's Education																		
Medium	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
Low	0.5708	0.0608	***	0.5727	0.2548	**	-0.4391	0.1167	***	0.2750	0.2597		0.4328	0.0808	***	0.8816	0.1858	***
High	-0.5780	0.0880	***	-0.5328	0.2092	**	0.1830	0.1188		-0.5622	0.2506	**	-0.3930	0.0924	***	-0.8055	0.1714	***
Partnes' relative education																		
Equally educ.	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
She more educ.	-0.1624	0.0634	**	0.0405	0.2066		-0.7202	0.1382	***	-0.1787	0.2154		-0.1545	0.0919	*	0.1537	0.1730	
She less educ.	0.2478	0.0571	***	0.00294	0.2200		0.8161	0.1267	***	0.1366	0.2291		0.1583	0.0799	**	-0.2270	0.1763	
Union Type																		
Marriage	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
Consensual Union	-0.2877	0.0671	***	-0.0952	0.1891		-0.5392	0.1004	***	0.0918	0.1277		-0.2791	0.0776	***	-0.0894	0.1001	
Number of Children																		
0	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
1-2 children	-0.1172	0.0453	***	-0.1124	0.1108		-0.1352	0.0877		-0.1458	0.1332		-0.1361	0.0655	**	-0.2292	0.1112	**
3+ children	0.0369	0.0690		-0.1274	0.1656		0.3800	0.1158	***	0.3767	0.1866	**	-0.2520	0.0896	***	-0.2009	0.1502	
Child's Age																		
Youngest >=6	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
Youngest <6	0.0133	0.0399		0.6144	0.1155	***	0.2625	0.0845	***	0.5836	0.1245	***	0.1571	0.0634	**	0.1399	0.1128	
Household income																		
decile 9-10	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
decile 7-8	-1.1110	0.0622	***	-1.1014	0.1533	***	-0.4592	0.1301	***	-0.5791	0.1707	***	-0.9199	0.1006	***	-0.5797	0.1604	***
decile 5-6	-0.2058	0.0547	***	-0.3117	0.1512	**	0.1718	0.1242		-0.2595	0.1703		-0.3195	0.0875	***	0.0703	0.1437	
decile 3-4	1.0087	0.0556	***	0.7878	0.1480	***	0.6047	0.1267	***	0.1243	0.2119		0.5396	0.0904	***	0.1821	0.1705	
decile 1-2	1.7622	0.0724	***	1.9261	0.1724	***	0.9450	0.1401	***	1.7708	0.2095	***	1.7248	0.1040	***	1.7074	0.2149	***

(***) p<0.01; (**) p<0.05; (*) p<0.1

Table 2: *Man Breadwinner* vs. *Dual-earner* couples: parameter estimates, standard errors and level of significance by country (continue)

	Poland			**Portugal**			**Spain**			**Sweden**			**Slovakia**			**United Kingdome**		
	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p
Intercept	-0.3686	0.1038	***	-1.2399	0.2043	***	-0.3792	0.0803	***	-1.9697	0.1194	***	-1.0566	0.1979	***	-0.7508	0.0852	***
Woman's Age																		
45-54 Years	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
35-44 Years	-0.2895	0.0482	***	-0.1798	0.0912	**	-0.1235	0.0473	***	0.0879	0.1232		-0.3323	0.0996	***	-0.2089	0.0716	***
25-34 Years	-0.0174	0.0534		-0.3982	0.1147	***	-0.5855	0.0600	***	-0.1192	0.1464		-0.0181	0.1159		-0.0403	0.0797	
Woman's Education																		
Medium	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
Low	0.7299	0.0993	***	0.3184	0.1895	*	0.2249	0.0573	***	0.8650	0.1816	***	-0.0991	0.2228		0.2805	0.1007	***
High	-1.0367	0.0975	***	-0.3718	0.2355		-0.2452	0.0643	***	-0.4787	0.1605	***	0.00599	0.1888		-0.2867	0.0891	***
Partnes' relative education																		
Equally educ.	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
She more educ.	-0.0566	0.0875		-0.4593	0.2445	*	-0.1802	0.0721	**	-0.0569	0.1603		-0.2315	0.2076		0.00150	0.0872	
She less educ.	0.1627	0.0924	*	0.5794	0.2016	***	0.2271	0.0636	***	0.0198	0.1743		0.1919	0.1751		0.0569	0.0951	
Union Type																		
Marriage	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
Consensual Union	-0.1871	0.0927	**	-0.4215	0.1479	***	-0.1817	0.0694	***	-0.0755	0.0966		0.1692	0.1743		-0.1254	0.0727	*
Number of Children																		
0	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
1-2 children	-0.2033	0.0458	***	-0.2869	0.0943	***	0.0230	0.0521		0.0174	0.1184		-0.0777	0.0950		-0.0815	0.0709	
3+ children	-0.0200	0.0611		0.1263	0.1380		-0.1556	0.0788	**	-0.7555	0.1719	***	-0.4151	0.1275	***	0.3453	0.0945	***
Child's Age																		
Youngest >=6	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
Youngest <6	0.3211	0.0441	***	0.0514	0.0893		0.2411	0.0455	***	0.3426	0.1139	***	0.6467	0.0904	***	0.5437	0.0638	***
Household income																		
decile 9-10	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
decile 7-8	-0.6051	0.0652	***	-0.8629	0.1357	***	-0.6913	0.0658	***	-0.6037	0.1620	***	-0.7969	0.1310	***	-1.0444	0.1027	***
decile 5-6	-0.1840	0.0632	***	-0.2543	0.1211	**	0.0313	0.0616		-0.0649	0.1572		0.1135	0.1263		-0.2217	0.0930	**
decile 3-4	0.3570	0.0612	***	0.5239	0.1267	***	0.7948	0.0678	***	0.6485	0.1659	***	0.5350	0.1342	***	0.5243	0.1044	***
decile 1-2	1.4851	0.0710	***	1.9527	0.1458	***	1.3083	0.0832	***	1.5567	0.1884	***	1.4280	0.1346	***	1.5120	0.1318	***

(***) p<0.01; (**) p<0.05; (*) p<0.1

Table 3: *Man Main Provider and Woman Main Provider vs. Equal Providers* couples: parameter estimates, standard errors and level of significance by country

	Austria			Belgium			Cyprus			Czech Republic			Denmark			Estonia		
	Man Main Provider vs. Equal Providers																	
	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p
Intercept	0.398	0.167	**	0.323	0.180	*	-0.021	0.333		0.225	0.229		0.556	0.177	***	0.409	0.240	*
Woman's Age																		
45-54 Years	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
35-44 Years	-0.027	0.087		-0.028	0.091		0.246	0.099	**	-0.113	0.098		-0.022	0.065		0.014	0.097	
25-34 Years	-0.093	0.105		-0.086	0.106		-0.192	0.112	*	0.326	0.107	***	0.012	0.081		0.001	0.128	
Woman's Education																		
Medium	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
Low	0.004	0.148		0.095	0.126		0.341	0.147	**	0.280	0.250		-0.013	0.103		-0.046	0.224	
High	-0.141	0.139		-0.316	0.109	***	-0.476	0.126	***	-0.142	0.197		-0.013	0.083		0.055	0.159	
Couple's Relative Education																		
Equally educ.	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
She more educ.	-0.622	0.157	***	-0.410	0.118	***	-0.463	0.132	***	-0.880	0.251	***	-0.433	0.083	***	-0.364	0.144	**
She less educ.	0.615	0.137	***	0.551	0.139	***	0.385	0.149	***	0.783	0.204	***	0.553	0.095	***	0.311	0.167	*
Union Type																		
Marriage	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
Consens. Union	-0.176	0.108		-0.185	0.095	*	-0.659	0.293	**	-0.222	0.128	*	0.040	0.059		-0.129	0.086	
Number of Children																		
0	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
1-2 children	0.064	0.094		-0.087	0.089		-0.010	0.098		-0.004	0.111		0.021	0.065		0.157	0.094	*
3+ children	0.179	0.142		0.412	0.130	***	-0.090	0.125		0.328	0.181	*	0.151	0.101		0.153	0.129	
Child's Age																		
Youngest >=6	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
Youngest <6	0.319	0.093	***	0.070	0.088		0.028	0.088		0.193	0.110	*	0.177	0.063	***	0.256	0.109	**
Man Main Income																		
Other sources	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
Self-empl.	-0.282	0.089	***	0.031	0.103		0.166	0.094	*	0.091	0.092		0.035	0.093		-0.320	0.203	
Woman Main Income																		
Other sources	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
Self-empl.	0.062	0.106		0.278	0.123	**	-0.082	0.114		0.022	0.124		0.489	0.132	***	0.736	0.202	***
Household Income																		
decile 9-10	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
decile 7-8	-0.370	0.116	***	-0.230	0.153		-0.076	0.155		-0.111	0.129		-0.188	0.112	*	0.369	0.134	**
decile 5-6	-0.186	0.122		0.089	0.161		0.230	0.162		-0.422	0.147	***	-0.182	0.122		-0.098	0.142	
decile 3-4	0.467	0.152	***	0.498	0.239	**	0.089	0.200		0.160	0.173		0.256	0.174		-0.285	0.196	
decile 1-2	0.176	0.211		-0.349	0.427		0.367	0.426		0.054	0.251		0.067	0.326		-0.215	0.297	
	Woman Main Provider vs. Equal-Providers																	
	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p
Intercept	-1.469	0.336	***	-1.538	0.340	***	-6.425	0.400	***	-1.458	0.487	***	-0.529	0.251	**	-1.547	0.454	***
Woman's Age																		
45-54 Years	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
35-44 Years	0.106	0.182		0.279	0.193		0.040	0.193		-0.064	0.201		0.171	0.126		-0.047	0.151	
25-34 Years	-0.508	0.243	**	-0.336	0.239		-0.184	0.213		0.145	0.214		-0.458	0.162	***	-0.082	0.199	
Woman's Education																		
Medium	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
Low	-0.452	0.318		-0.601	0.332	*	-0.389	0.330		1.062	0.453	**	-0.150	0.209		0.033	0.353	
High	0.237	0.289		0.550	0.259	**	0.618	0.244	**	-0.305	0.348		0.417	0.160	***	0.306	0.244	
Couple's Relative Education																		
Equally educ.	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
She more educ.	0.236	0.272		-0.214	0.249		0.034	0.256		1.551	0.478	***	0.111	0.155		0.330	0.218	
She less educ.	0.243	0.264		0.475	0.333		-0.027	0.365		-2.072	0.765	***	0.082	0.205		-0.242	0.289	
Union Type																		
Marriage	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
Consens. Union	-0.292	0.262		-0.133	0.201		-	-	-	0.148	0.206		0.158	0.107		0.108	0.128	
Number of Children																		
0	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
1-2 children	-0.224	0.188		-0.286	0.192		-0.231	0.177		-0.268	0.230		0.093	0.142		0.302	0.149	**
3+ children	-0.134	0.271		-0.226	0.272		-0.123	0.233		0.151	0.364		-0.982	0.236	***	-0.454	0.219	**
Child Age																		
Youngest >=6	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
Youngest <6	0.057	0.205		0.213	0.188		-0.284	0.183		-0.047	0.241		0.018	0.130		-0.070	0.181	
Man Main Income																		
Other sources	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
Self-empl.	0.455	0.144	***	0.641	0.160	***	-0.096	0.208		0.516	0.158	***	0.505	0.125	***	1.198	0.171	***
Woman Main Income																		
Other sources	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
Self-empl.	0.170	0.179		-0.157	0.253		-0.315	0.276		-0.098	0.240		0.541	0.199	***	-1.570	0.430	***
Household income																		
decile 9-10	Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.			Ref.		
decile 7-8	-0.788	0.266	***	-0.684	0.262	***	0.058	0.257		-0.424	0.277		-1.003	0.167	***	-0.643	0.197	***
decile 5-6	-0.391	0.262		-0.550	0.306	*	-0.478	0.327		-0.243	0.288		-0.121	0.172		-0.346	0.194	*
decile 3-4	0.638	0.266	**	1.436	0.322	***	-0.582	0.460		0.201	0.349		0.771	0.229	***	0.443	0.231	*
decile 1-2	1.357	0.290	***	0.841	0.523		1.638	0.528	***	0.477	0.427		1.957	0.324	***	1.128	0.321	***

Table 3: *Man Main Provider and Woman Main Provider vs. Equal Providers* couples: parameter estimates, standard errors and level of significance by country (continue)

	Finland			France			Greece			Hungary			Ireland			Iceland		
	Man Main Provider vs. Equal Providers																	
	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p
Intercept	0.483	0.075	***	0.361	0.142	**	0.051	0.246		0.043	0.165		1.240	0.296	***	1.099	0.224	***
Woman's Age																		
45-54 Years																		
35-44 Years	-0.067	0.052		-0.017	0.063		-0.075	0.101		-0.004	0.084		0.073	0.100		-0.196	0.098	**
25-34 Years	0.028	0.066		0.026	0.077		0.124	0.118		0.242	0.089	***	-0.253	0.125	**	0.051	0.125	
Woman's Education																		
Medium																		
Low	-0.192	0.090		-0.023	0.094		0.256	0.136	*	-0.157	0.147		-0.032	0.135		0.161	0.124	
High	0.054	0.069		0.059	0.085		-0.399	0.125	***	-0.016	0.135		-0.225	0.118	*	-0.341	0.117	***
Couple's Relative Education																		
Equally educ.																		
She more educ.	-0.414	0.066	***	-0.496	0.082	***	-0.097	0.136		-0.471	0.141	***	-0.438	0.126	***	-0.204	0.129	
She less educ.	0.491	0.081	***	0.498	0.093	***	0.409	0.147	***	0.625	0.144	***	0.546	0.153	***	0.226	0.136	*
Union Type																		
Marriage																		
Consens. Union	0.036	0.048		-0.218	0.056	***	-0.377	0.217	*	-0.089	0.088		-0.131	0.122		0.066	0.082	
Number of Children																		
0																		
1-2 children	0.037	0.049		-0.115	0.064	*	0.140	0.109		-0.119	0.088		-0.045	0.100		0.045	0.090	
3+ children	0.180	0.069	***	0.373	0.099	***	-0.320	0.165	*	0.266	0.135	**	0.089	0.135		0.353	0.117	***
Child's Age																		
Youngest >=6																		
Youngest <6	0.342	0.052	***	-0.086	0.060		-0.030	0.094		0.219	0.082	***	0.058	0.094		0.205	0.089	**
Man Main Income																		
Other sources																		
Self-empl.	-0.125	0.044	***	0.069	0.082		0.322	0.083	***	0.022	0.084		0.058	0.095		-0.431	0.130	***
Woman Main Income																		
Other sources																		
Self-empl.	0.043	0.051		0.053	0.116		0.249	0.094	***	-0.070	0.124		0.341	0.156	**	0.908	0.217	***
Household Income																		
decile 9-10																		
decile 7-8	-0.164	0.075	**	-0.456	0.086	***	-0.274	0.138	**	-0.112	0.110		-0.406	0.250		-0.029	0.125	
decile 5-6	-0.178	0.081	**	-0.453	0.091	***	0.029	0.154		-0.096	0.119		-0.303	0.262		0.184	0.132	
decile 3-4	0.263	0.109	**	0.310	0.109	***	0.661	0.190	***	-0.171	0.129		0.277	0.377		0.195	0.156	
decile 1-2	-0.078	0.158		0.780	0.193	***	-0.146	0.257		0.267	0.165		1.200	0.860		-0.463	0.229	**
	Woman Main Provider vs. Equal-Providers																	
	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p
Intercept	-1.072	0.117	***	-0.295	0.171	*	-1.161	0.372	***	-0.547	0.204	***	-0.364	0.413		-1.349	0.432	***
Woman's Age																		
45-54 Years																		
35-44 Years	0.017	0.080		0.042	0.102		0.160	0.180		0.188	0.106	*	0.136	0.179		-0.207	0.184	
25-34 Years	-0.338	0.105	***	-0.060	0.122		-0.063	0.219		-0.249	0.122	**	-0.068	0.225		-0.212	0.231	
Woman's Education																		
Medium																		
Low	-0.106	0.133		-0.211	0.165		-0.062	0.254		0.198	0.183		-0.796	0.320	**	-0.162	0.240	
High	0.258	0.102	**	0.377	0.137	***	0.507	0.226	**	-0.067	0.166		0.884	0.234	***	0.418	0.214	*
Couple's Relative Education																		
Equally educ.																		
She more educ.	0.110	0.098		0.017	0.131		0.232	0.245		0.716	0.167	***	0.106	0.232		0.210	0.232	
She less educ.	0.017	0.130		0.102	0.166		0.129	0.307		-0.664	0.207	***	0.212	0.345		-0.098	0.274	
Union Type																		
Marriage																		
Consens. Union	0.175	0.069	**	-0.036	0.086		-0.046	0.317		0.071	0.112		-0.206	0.220		0.329	0.137	**
Number of Children																		
0																		
1-2 children	-0.003	0.075		-0.166	0.108		0.105	0.207		-0.135	0.116		-0.035	0.180		0.215	0.166	
3+ children	-0.401	0.109	***	-0.118	0.172		-0.528	0.330		0.106	0.180		-0.296	0.245		-0.264	0.219	
Child Age																		
Youngest >=6																		
Youngest <6	-0.062	0.087		-0.005	0.098		0.008	0.172		-0.073	0.120		0.059	0.168		-0.097	0.169	
Man Main Income																		
Other sources																		
Self-empl.	0.172	0.060	***	0.473	0.103	***	0.531	0.134	***	0.334	0.096	***	0.893	0.136	***	0.341	0.162	**
Woman Main Income																		
Other sources																		
Self-empl.	-0.520	0.087	***	0.556	0.130	***	0.693	0.144	***	-0.024	0.146		0.019	0.264		-0.267	0.423	
Household income																		
decile 9-10																		
decile 7-8	-0.820	0.108	***	-0.678	0.139	***	-0.427	0.259	*	-0.103	0.139		-1.050	0.315	***	-0.896	0.261	***
decile 5-6	-0.177	0.108		-0.504	0.147	***	0.211	0.263		0.027	0.146		-1.306	0.368	***	0.423	0.211	**
decile 3-4	0.846	0.132	***	0.348	0.165	**	0.880	0.319	***	-0.059	0.161		0.966	0.459	**	0.426	0.257	*
decile 1-2	1.085	0.178	***	1.164	0.237	***	-0.038	0.447		0.497	0.193	**	3.013	0.910	***	0.982	0.291	***

Table 3: *Man Main Provider and Woman Main Provider vs. Equal Providers* couples: parameter estimates, standard errors and level of significance by country (continue)

	Italy			Lithuania			Luxembourg			Latvia			Netherlands			Norway		
	Man Main Provider vs. Equal Providers																	
	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p
Intercept	0.376	0.082	***	0.608	0.300	**	0.932	0.257	***	0.348	0.274		0.865	0.118	***	0.9338	0.166	***
Woman's Age																		
45-54 Years																		
35-44 Years	0.028	0.044		-0.147	0.098		-0.177	0.111		-0.045	0.118		0.070	0.067		-0.1073	0.069	
25-34 Years	0.036	0.052		0.177	0.120		-0.181	0.120		0.143	0.139		-0.408	0.075	***	0.0953	0.085	
Woman's Education																		
Medium																		
Low	0.030	0.057		-0.112	0.274		-0.060	0.148		0.257	0.277		0.136	0.094		0.4036	0.161	**
High	0.000	0.064		-0.009	0.183		-0.212	0.137		-0.449	0.205	**	-0.235	0.078	***	-0.4153	0.108	***
Couple's Relative Education																		
Equally educ.																		
She more educ.	-0.352	0.059	***	-0.715	0.171	***	-0.528	0.156	***	-0.326	0.185	*	-0.482	0.080	***	-0.5272	0.095	***
She less educ.	0.360	0.063	***	0.664	0.191	***	0.550	0.168	***	0.470	0.231	**	0.542	0.092	***	0.3646	0.112	***
Union Type																		
Marriage																		
Consens. Union	-0.053	0.057		-0.017	0.202		-0.255	0.092	***	0.061	0.127		-0.327	0.056	***	-0.0995	0.057	*
Number of Children																		
0																		
1-2 children	0.026	0.054		0.152	0.108		-0.069	0.115		0.070	0.132		0.313	0.069	***	-0.0026	0.066	
3+ children	0.277	0.089	***	0.170	0.177		0.273	0.170		0.289	0.216		0.116	0.098		0.3196	0.096	***
Child's Age																		
Youngest >=6																		
Youngest <6	0.050	0.042		0.346	0.113	***	0.189	0.103	*	0.103	0.121		-0.078	0.064		0.2716	0.067	***
Man Main Income																		
Other sources																		
Self-empl.	-0.002	0.036		0.318	0.133	**	0.376	0.216	*	-0.263	0.146	*	-0.459	0.089	***	0.0757	0.088	
Woman Main Income																		
Other sources																		
Self-empl.	0.104	0.041	**	0.498	0.127	***	0.073	0.205		0.348	0.214		0.161	0.100		0.1432	0.128	
Household Income																		
decile 9-10																		
decile 7-8	-0.555	0.062	***	0.276	0.135	**	0.175	0.157		0.178	0.165		-0.446	0.090	***	-0.0013	0.115	
decile 5-6	-0.118	0.067	*	-0.181	0.159		-0.007	0.165		-0.193	0.181		0.140	0.100		-0.1266	0.117	
decile 3-4	0.529	0.089	***	-0.317	0.207		0.129	0.176		-0.112	0.249		0.526	0.134	***	0.0342	0.145	
decile 1-2	0.169	0.133		-0.247	0.299		-0.064	0.193		-0.259	0.366		0.379	0.195	*	0.1509	0.320	
	Woman Main Provider vs. Equal-Providers																	
	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p
Intercept	-1.246	0.143	***	-0.354	0.418		-1.064	0.398	***	-0.555	0.358		-1.255	0.206	***	-0.285	0.229	
Woman's Age																		
45-54 Years																		
35-44 Years	0.056	0.084		-0.076	0.124		0.307	0.203		0.087	0.162		0.247	0.133	*	-0.045	0.122	
25-34 Years	-0.324	0.103	***	-0.168	0.161		-0.599	0.239	**	0.131	0.193		-0.423	0.154	***	-0.218	0.149	
Woman's Education																		
Medium																		
Low	-0.371	0.115	***	-0.868	0.530		-0.643	0.308	**	-0.330	0.419		-0.326	0.221		0.081	0.278	
High	0.372	0.112	***	0.598	0.307	*	0.627	0.264	**	0.443	0.287		0.426	0.161	***	0.001	0.185	
Couple's Relative Education																		
Equally educ.																		
She more educ.	0.149	0.116		0.163	0.211		-0.253	0.281		0.181	0.251		0.150	0.163		0.008	0.162	
She less educ.	-0.274	0.153	*	-0.018	0.290		0.343	0.342		0.103	0.355		-0.137	0.227		-0.043	0.212	
Union Type																		
Marriage																		
Consens. Union	0.116	0.100		0.112	0.258		0.155	0.159		0.043	0.171		0.014	0.111		0.079	0.097	
Number of Children																		
0																		
1-2 children	-0.114	0.099		0.309	0.143	**	0.180	0.232		-0.130	0.179		0.142	0.138		-0.1669	0.116	
3+ children	0.099	0.159		-0.089	0.240		-0.317	0.367		0.206	0.286		-0.270	0.197		-0.4333	0.171	**
Child Age																		
Youngest >=6																		
Youngest <6	0.085	0.081		0.083	0.156		-0.104	0.202		-0.207	0.183		-0.085	0.127		0.3285	0.119	***
Man Main Income																		
Other sources																		
Self-empl.	0.268	0.065	***	0.488	0.146	***	0.759	0.293	***	-0.186	0.192		0.421	0.129	***	0.4430	0.119	***
Woman Main Income																		
Other sources																		
Self-empl.	0.114	0.073		0.379	0.159	**	-0.030	0.343		0.431	0.259	*	-0.058	0.175		0.2455	0.184	
Household income																		
decile 9-10																		
decile 7-8	-0.906	0.124	***	-0.053	0.161		0.083	0.287		-0.510	0.225	**	-0.649	0.177	***	-0.3143	0.171	**
decile 5-6	-0.182	0.122		-0.258	0.192		0.186	0.299		-0.228	0.235		-0.252	0.194		-0.2896	0.177	
decile 3-4	0.401	0.153	***	0.132	0.234		0.212	0.354		0.269	0.307		0.461	0.234	**	0.6672	0.196	***
decile 1-2	1.003	0.184	***	0.459	0.321		0.037	0.415		0.729	0.386	*	1.246	0.272	***	1.1620	0.383	***

Table 3: *Man Main Provider and Woman Main Provider vs. Equal Providers* couples: parameter estimates, standard errors and level of significance by country (continue)

	Poland			Portugal			Spain			Sweden			Slovakia			UK		
	Man Main Provider vs. Equal Providers																	
	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p
Intercept	0.628	0.160	***	0.329	0.221		-0.148	0.114		0.199	0.184		-0.059	0.261		0.623	0.130	***
Woman's Age																		
45-54 Years																		
35-44 Years	0.036	0.061		-0.007	0.091		0.014	0.059		-0.022	0.073		-0.095	0.080		0.001	0.067	
25-34 Years	0.194	0.068	***	0.121	0.108		0.010	0.069		0.034	0.088		0.323	0.098	***	-0.034	0.074	
Woman's Education																		
Medium																		
Low	0.260	0.157		0.423	0.143	***	0.337	0.071	***	-0.031	0.146		0.332	0.196	*	0.310	0.110	***
High	-0.375	0.112	***	-0.525	0.151	***	-0.322	0.071	***	0.026	0.103		-0.347	0.149	**	-0.412	0.086	***
Couple's Relative Education																		
Equally educ.																		
She more educ.	-0.470	0.108	***	-0.600	0.181	***	-0.179	0.080	**	-0.322	0.093	***	-0.462	0.163	***	-0.037	0.083	
She less educ.	0.461	0.131	***	0.724	0.212	***	0.240	0.084	***	0.333	0.115	***	0.486	0.142	***	0.080	0.098	
Union Type																		
Marriage																		
Consens. Union	-0.007	0.117		-0.082	0.124		-0.105	0.073		-0.133	0.057	**	-0.210	0.167		-0.218	0.063	***
Number of Children																		
0																		
1-2 children	0.022	0.061		-0.023	0.104		-0.008	0.067		0.127	0.069	*	-0.001	0.078		0.112	0.074	
3+ children	0.007	0.087		0.157	0.164		0.212	0.109	*	0.010	0.101		0.168	0.108		0.581	0.117	***
Child's Age																		
Youngest >=6																		
Youngest <6	0.016	0.058		0.123	0.086		0.107	0.056	*	0.320	0.069	***	0.109	0.083		0.027	0.067	
Man Main Income																		
Other sources																		
Self-empl.	0.147	0.072	**	-0.003	0.097		-0.476	0.069	***	-0.358	0.117	***	-0.148	0.116		0.034	0.070	
Woman Main Income																		
Other sources																		
Self-empl.	0.597	0.085	***	0.423	0.117	***	-0.018	0.073		0.095	0.152		0.290	0.166	*	0.088	0.094	
Household Income																		
decile 9-10																		
decile 7-8	0.058	0.082		0.077	0.132		-0.226	0.082	***	-0.097	0.105		-0.132	0.103		0.091	0.099	
decile 5-6	-0.154	0.089	*	-0.309	0.134	**	0.320	0.090	***	-0.038	0.110		-0.185	0.119		0.221	0.113	*
decile 3-4	-0.237	0.096	**	-0.586	0.163	***	0.403	0.114	***	0.002	0.142		-0.254	0.138	*	0.305	0.157	*
decile 1-2	-0.033	0.146		0.377	0.275		-0.178	0.149		0.225	0.248		0.250	0.175		-0.643	0.236	***
	Woman Main Provider vs. Equal-Providers																	
	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p	Par.est.	S.e.	p
Intercept	0.254	0.182		-0.711	0.439		-1.539	0.191	***	-0.581	0.235	**	-0.988	0.414	**	-0.797	0.191	***
Woman's Age																		
45-54 Years																		
35-44 Years	-0.012	0.072		0.110	0.144		-0.064	0.104		-0.069	0.127		-0.276	0.135	**	0.172	0.109	
25-34 Years	-0.084	0.083		-0.360	0.183	**	-0.049	0.121		-0.045	0.154		-0.012	0.171		-0.266	0.124	**
Woman's Education																		
Medium																		
Low	0.205	0.197		-0.446	0.240	*	-0.112	0.142		-0.617	0.280	**	-0.325	0.390		0.164	0.188	
High	-0.174	0.134		0.609	0.209	***	0.440	0.123	***	0.744	0.188	***	0.150	0.262		-0.205	0.141	
Couple's Relative Education																		
Equally educ.																		
She more educ.	0.320	0.127	**	0.618	0.400		0.337	0.133	**	-0.230	0.155		0.363	0.226		0.357	0.139	**
She less educ.	-0.326	0.182	*	-0.750	0.704		-0.069	0.172		0.399	0.206	*	-0.107	0.243		-0.390	0.184	**
Union Type																		
Marriage																		
Consens. Union	0.272	0.125	**	0.258	0.170		-0.050	0.122		-0.012	0.099		-0.206	0.288		0.079	0.095	
Number of Children																		
0																		
1-2 children	0.087	0.072		0.093	0.167		-0.199	0.115	*	0.154	0.121		-0.182	0.124		-0.055	0.125	
3+ children	0.002	0.103		-0.074	0.259		0.195	0.185		-0.388	0.177	**	0.224	0.165		0.025	0.197	
Child Age																		
Youngest >=6																		
Youngest <6	0.002	0.071		0.172	0.139		-0.051	0.102		-0.106	0.124		-0.022	0.149		0.013	0.119	
Man Main Income																		
Other sources																		
Self-empl.	0.574	0.071	***	0.774	0.118	***	0.619	0.084	***	0.631	0.124	***	0.704	0.121	***	0.391	0.096	***
Woman Main Income																		
Other sources																		
Self-empl.	0.155	0.106		-0.148	0.194		-0.452	0.141	***	0.211	0.196		0.053	0.250		-0.036	0.145	
Household income																		
decile 9-10																		
decile 7-8	-0.122	0.097		-0.172	0.207		-0.149	0.145		-0.965	0.178	***	-0.403	0.176	**	-0.616	0.157	***
decile 5-6	-0.144	0.104		-0.616	0.236	***	-0.053	0.171		-0.231	0.166		0.071	0.179		-0.213	0.173	
decile 3-4	-0.281	0.116	**	-0.081	0.243		0.374	0.192	**	0.413	0.195	**	0.202	0.198		0.460	0.215	**
decile 1-2	0.527	0.152		1.423	0.335	***	0.178	0.249		1.663	0.269	***	0.373	0.248		0.661	0.261	**